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18 June 1960

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE


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Communist China is taking advantage of world attention on President Eisenhower's Asian tour to make a dramatic demonstration of Peiping's unwillingness to accept the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Late on 17 June, Chinese batteries opposite the Nationalist-held islands in Amoy harbor began a heavy bombardment which an earlier Communist announcement had said would be a "great demonstration of arms" to coincide with the President's arrival on Taiwan. The Nationalists have said they will retaliate if the bombardment resumes when he leaves on 19 June, as the Communists have threatened.

A reported 85,925 rounds were fired onto Chinmen and nearby islands on 17 June, the highest daily total in Chinmen's history, with over 54,000 rounds reported in a final 45 minute period. On the heaviest day of the 1958 crisis, 60,889 rounds were fired. On 20 October 1958, over 11,000 rounds were fired during the Taiwan visit of Secretary of State Dulles. The Communists have substantially augmented their artillery in the Chinmen area since 1958, and they now can mass the fire of about 800 pieces and bring every point on the islands and the adjacent waters within range.

The Chinese Communists, who have called the President's visit to Taiwan "an intrigue to perpetuate two Chinas" and have accused the US of military "provocations" in the area, probably feel they must underscore their charges with a military display to avoid the implication of weakness. Peiping, however, has been careful to point out that shelling will follow the alternate-day schedule and has emphasized the "demonstration" aspects. This suggests the Communists hope to avoid any action which would be interpreted as a challenge to US military forces in the area or as an effort to interdict supply of the Chinmen complex.

The Peiping announcement was solicitous about the welfare of "compatriots" in the Chinmen garrison—a customary device to encourage dissension—but the Nationalists were warned against any efforts to retaliate. Stressing that the bombardment was a demonstration against the US alone, the Chinese Communists avoided any reference to their usual position that the Strait situation is part of the civil war and not a matter "between China and the US." Peiping's action is likely to draw unfavorable reaction from some Asian neutrals, who will interpret it as further indication of Peiping's bellicosity.

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Disturbances Rumored Imminent in Iran

5X1	25X1	Rumors of imminent disturbances are again circulating in Tehran. Such rumors—this time inspired by the absence of the Shah, on vacation at the Caspian, and top security officials, who are abroad—are common whenever high officials	<u>.</u>	
		are away from Tehran.		25X1
	_	In addition, the operations chief of the counterintelligence corps has been unexpectedly ordered to make an inspection trip which will take him away from the capital on 18 June.		
		Dissatisfaction with the Shah's regime has long existed, and events in Turkey and Korea have increased antiregime plotting. No group, however, is known to be in a position to carry		
		out a successful coup.		25X1
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	_	An attempt to overthrow the government could occur with little warning, sparked either by an accidental occurrence or by a sudden move of a small group hoping for quick victory before the opposition rallies.		25X ⁻
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Moroccan Government May Make New Demands Regarding American Bases

Moroccan Foreign Minister Driss M'Hammedi has informed the American Embassy that the new Moroccan Government installed on 26 May now is ready to participate in a mixed commission to discuss problems incident to the withdrawal of American forces from Morocco. M'Hammedi suggested that the initial meeting of this commission be held on 20 June. He proposed that the commission be authorized to consider the status of American forces during the remainder of their tenure, a timetable for withdrawal, and future operation of the bases by the Moroccan Government.

On 28 May M'Hammedi had inquired informally whether the evacuation of American troops from Morocco could be accelerated, and implied that it would be desirable for all foreign troops to be out of the country by the time a constitution—which the King has promised before the end of 1962—is promulgated.

The American charge d'affaires, who has reported a "rising press orchestration" on the question of the evacuation of French and Spanish as well as American troops, expects that Moroccan efforts during base discussions will be directed primarily toward reducing the privileges now enjoyed by American forces as well as the period of their tenure. Both the Balafrej and Ibrahim governments progressively increased Moroccan civil and criminal jurisdiction over off-base offenses committed by American troops. Both also sought to eliminate such morale-building services as the post exchange and military postal systems, which they considered deprived the Moroccan treasury of rightful revenue.

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